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ABSTRACT
Most studies suggest that environmental taxes are regressive, and thus are unattractive policy
options. We consider the distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase using three welfare measures and
under three scenarios for gas tax revenue use. To incorporate behavioral responses we use Consumer
Expenditure Survey data to estimate a consumer demand system that includes gasoline, other goods, and
leisure. We find that the gas tax is regressive, but that returning the revenue through a lump-sum transfer
more than offsets this, yielding a net increase in progressivity. We also find that ignoring behavioral
changes in distributional calculations overstates both the overall burden of the tax and its regressivity.
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I. Introduction 
Distributional effects represent an important concern in designing and evaluating 
environmental policy.  Most studies suggest that environmental taxes tend to be at least mildly 
regressive, making such taxes less attractive options for policy.  In this paper, we consider the 
distributional effects of a gasoline tax increase.  The gasoline tax’s regressivity is often cited as 
one of the strongest arguments against increasing this tax.  We show, however, that increasing 
the gas tax does not have to be regressive; the revenue can be used to achieve a net gain in 
progressivity, though this does come at a significant efficiency cost. 
Our study makes three main contributions.  First, we examine the importance of 
considering behavioral effects in calculating the incidence of environmental taxes.  Many find 
that because gasoline has an income elasticity of less than one, taxes on gasoline would be 
regressive (see for example Kayser [11], Poterba [16], Sevigny [17], Sipes and Mendelsohn [19], 
and Walls et al. [22]).  These studies provide evidence on the distributional effects of gasoline 
taxes holding household behavior constant, or assuming that all households have the same degree 
of price responsiveness.
2   
Ignoring demand responses significantly simplifies tax incidence analysis, and, as long as 
the behavioral changes are small, it will introduce little error.  However, it is not clear that this 
will be the case for environmental taxes; proposed carbon taxes would lead to double-digit (or 
larger) percentage increases in fossil fuel prices, while a gasoline tax equal to marginal damage 
would nearly double the price of gasoline.  With tax changes of this magnitude, even if demand 
is relatively inelastic, the behavioral changes–and thus the error that would result from ignoring 
such changes in calculating incidence–may be important.  In addition, these behavioral changes 
may differ across income groups.  For example, because poor households have smaller budgets,   4 
they may be more responsive to prices than the wealthy.  On the other hand, if poor people have 
fewer transportation options, they may be less price-responsive.  Our study provides incidence 
estimates that assume no behavioral changes as well as estimates allowing for such changes.  The 
differences between the two sets of estimates illustrates the importance of including behavioral 
changes in distributional estimates.  
Second, this paper considers three scenarios for gas tax revenue use: that it is discarded, 
that it is used to cut taxes on wage income, and that it is returned through a uniform lump-sum 
distribution.  The first scenario implies that the net wage and lump-sum income for each 
household will remain constant: only the price of gasoline changes.  The second scenario implies 
that net wages will rise, because the recycled revenue will lead to a drop in marginal tax rates.  
The third scenario implies that household lump-sum income will rise.
3  Discarding the revenue is 
useful as a benchmark, as it isolates the distributional effect of the gas tax itself.  Using the 
revenue to lower the tax rate on wages is a policy designed to be efficient, with no concern for 
distributional issues.  Most recent studies of second-best optimal environmental taxes assume 
that revenue is returned in this fashion (see, for example, West and Williams [24] or Parry and 
Small [15]).  Finally, returning the revenue through a lump-sum transfer yields a more 
progressive distributional effect. 
Third, this paper tests the importance of considering cross-price elasticities in calculating 
incidence.  To do this, it will calculate two sets of incidence estimates that incorporate behavioral 
changes: one based on partial-equilibrium consumer surplus, and one based on the equivalent 
variation, which incorporates cross-price effects.  While a small number of studies have looked 
at the effects of incorporating behavioral responses in calculating the incidence of environmental 
taxes, only one prior study, Brannlünd and Nordström [2], explicitly incorporates cross-price   5 
elasticities, and it does not discuss the importance of such cross-price effects, nor does it provide 
a second set of estimates that exclude cross-price effects.   However, given the importance of 
cross-price elasticities in other contexts (the efficiency of taxation, for example), it is possible 
that such elasticities may be important here as well.  In particular, the cross-price elasticity 
between gasoline and leisure is likely to be important when the gasoline tax revenue is used to 
cut the labor tax; responses to the changing labor tax rate may affect the burden of the gas tax, 
and vice-versa.
4 
We use the 1996 through 1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys, which provide detailed 
data on household expenditures including gasoline expenditures, on vehicle holdings, and on 
each individual’s wages and working hours.  These data are merged with state-level price 
information from the American Chambers of Commerce Researchers’ Association (ACCRA) 
cost of living index.  We use the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM 
model to calculate marginal and average tax rates of each worker.  The resulting data set thus 
includes quantities and after-tax prices for all goods and leisure. 
Most commonly used functional forms impose separability, homotheticity, or both; the 
linear expenditure system (LES), for example, imposes additive separability, while a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function is both separable and homothetic.  We resolve 
these issues by using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) first derived by Deaton and 
Muellbauer [6].  The advantages of this system are well-known: it gives a first-order 
approximation to any demand system, satisfies the axioms of choice exactly, is simple to 
estimate, and does not impose either separability or homotheticity.  We estimate our demand 
system separately for one-adult households and for two-adult households with one female and 
one male and for different income quintiles within each group.     6 
We find that increasing the gas tax is generally regressive, but that this depends greatly 
on how the revenue is used; using the additional revenue to provide a lump-sum transfer to 
households more than offsets the regressivity of the gas tax, and thus in this case, increasing the 
gas tax is quite progressive.  In contrast, using the revenue to cut the tax on labor income yields 
an efficiency gain, but does little to offset–and may in fact exacerbate–the regressivity of the gas 
tax. 
  Incorporating demand responses is important for measuring both the overall burden and 
the distribution of that burden.  Ignoring such demand responses raises the measured welfare cost 
significantly for all income groups, but this effect is much weaker for the top quintile than for the 
rest of the income distribution.  Thus, studies that do not consider demand responses will 
substantially overstate the regressivity of the gas tax.  Finally, while cross-price elasticities play 
an important role in determining the change in the labor tax or lump-sum transfer made possible 
by the additional revenue from the higher tax–essentially an efficiency effect–they have little 
direct effect on the distribution of the burden of the tax. 
Section II describes the demand system, the data, and the estimation approach.  Section 
III discusses the approach used to calculate incidence and the results of those calculations, and 
Section IV concludes.  
 
II.  Demand System Estimates 
  This study uses the demand system developed in West and Williams [24], which is 
defined over three goods: leisure, gasoline, and all other goods.  However, that paper estimated 
the demand system only for a single representative agent, whereas the present paper estimates   7 
the system separately for each income quintile.  The remainder of this section describes the 
structure assumed for the demand system, the estimation approach, and the data used. 
 
A.  Specification of the Demand System 
  We consider the demand for leisure, gasoline, and all other goods.  To estimate this 
demand system, we use the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), first derived by Deaton and 
Muellbauer [6].  The advantages of this system are well-known:  it gives an arbitrary first-order 
approximation to any demand system, satisfies the axioms of choice exactly, is simple to 
estimate, and does not assume that the utility function is separable or homothetic.   
  The AIDS provides these advantages given that it is derived from a preference structure 
characterized by the expenditure function proposed in Muellbauer [13, 14]: 
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Applying Shepard’s Lemma, we obtain the demand equations for goods and leisure, in their 
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where  y is total income, the amount spent on gasoline, other goods, and leisure, and  P is the 
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Two-adult households have one leisure share equation (4b) for the household’s male 
adult and another for the household’s female adult.  
Provided that these restrictions hold, (4) represents a system of demand functions that add 
up to total income, are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and total income, and that satisfy 
Slutsky symmetry.  Budget shares sum to one. We impose (6) through (9) and drop the equation 
for other goods.   
 
B.  Data and Variable Derivation 
To estimate the model discussed above, we need data on expenditures, prices, wages, 
hours worked, and household and vehicle characteristics.  This section describes the two main 
sources of data used in this study: the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and the American   9 
Chamber of Commerce Researchers’ Association (ACCRA) cost-of-living index.  It also 
describes the derivation of variables used in the estimation and provides summary statistics. 
The 1996 through 1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX) are the main components 
of our data.  The CEX Family Interview files include the amount spent by each household on 
gasoline, total expenditures, information on each household’s vehicles, and a wide variety of 
income measures.  For each household member, the Member Files include usual weekly hours, 
occupation, the gross amount of last pay, the duration of the last pay period, and a variety of 
member income measures.   The CEX is a rotating panel survey.  Each quarter, 20 percent of the 
sample is rotated out and replaced by new consumer units.  We use data for each household from 
the first quarter in which the household appears.   
   For gas prices and the price of other goods, we use the ACCRA cost-of-living index.  
This index compiles prices of many separate goods as well as overall price levels for 
approximately 300 cities in the United States.  It is most widely used to calculate the difference 
in the overall cost-of-living between any two cities.  It also lists for each quarter the average 
prices of regular, unleaded, national-brand gasoline.  Since the CEX reports state of residence of 
each household, and not city, we average the cities within each state to obtain a state gasoline 
price and state price index for each calendar quarter.  Then we assign a gas price and a price 
index to each CEX household based on state of residence and CEX quarter.  We use the price 
index as our price of other goods. 
  Total income (y in equation (4) above)) equals the amount spent on gasoline, leisure, and 
all other goods.  The CEX contains quarterly gasoline expenditure.  Since it also contains hours 
worked per week, we divide quarterly gasoline expenditure by 13 to get weekly gas expenditure.  
To derive weekly leisure “expenditure”, we assume that the total number of hours available   10 
either to work or to consume leisure is equal to 12 hours per day, 7 days a week (for a total of 84 
hours per week).  We then subtract the number of hours worked per week from 84 to get hours of 
leisure per week.   To obtain the price of leisure (the wage) we first calculate the wage net of tax 
using state and federal effective tax rates generated from the NBER’s TAXSIM model (see 
Feenberg and Coutts, [8]).  Then, since we do not observe wages for individuals who are not 
working, we follow Heckman [9] to correct for this selectivity bias to obtain selectivity-corrected 
net wages.  We multiply weekly leisure hours and net wage rates to obtain leisure expenditures 
per week.  
  To calculate weekly spending on other goods, we first convert the CEX’s measure of 
quarterly total expenditures into weekly total expenditures.  Then, we subtract weekly gasoline 
expenditure from total weekly expenditures to obtain spending on all other goods. 
 
C.  Summary Statistics 
We estimate two demand systems:  one for one-adult households and the other for two-
adult households composed of one male and one female (where an adult is at least 18 years of 
age).  We do not include households with adults over the age of 65.  The twelve quarters in the 
1996 through 1998 Consumer Expenditure Surveys have 5046 such one-adult households and 
9619 two-adult households with complete records of the variables needed here.  We use the full 
samples to correct for selection bias in the wage, and households in which all adults work the 
system estimation.  Tables 1 and 2 list summary statistics for the one-adult and two-adult 
samples of workers.  The one-adult sample of workers contains 3633 households; the two-adult 
sample contains 6270 households.    11 
Households spend about 2 percent of their income on gasoline, a bit more than 50 percent 
on leisure, and the remainder on other goods.  The average selectivity-corrected net wage in the 
one-adult sample is $9.73 per hour.  Males in the two-adult sample make $11.08 per hour, while 
women make $8.60 per hour.  The overall wage distribution in our sample closely follows the 
wage distribution in the 1997 Current Population Survey.   
 
D.  Estimation  
The main estimation issues relate to the potential endogeneity of the regressors.  In 
particular, the net marginal wage may be endogenous for two reasons.  First, the gross wage is 
determined by dividing earnings by hours of work, and both variables may be measured with 
some error.  Thus hours worked and wages may be correlated.  Second, the marginal income tax 
rate depends on income.  We therefore use occupation to instrument for the net wage.
5 
In addition, if some households have zero expenditure on one or more of the goods, then 
another selection bias may arise.  To address this concern, we use a probit to estimate the 
dichotomous decision to consume or not to consume.  These regressions provide estimates for 
inverse Mills ratios, which we then include in estimation of the AIDS system.
6   
  Before we divide households into quintiles, we use an equivalence scale to adjust total 
expenditures on gasoline and other goods for different family sizes.  Our equivalence scale 
weights adults and children equally, but allows for economies of scale in consumption.  In 
specific, we divide total expenditures on gasoline and other goods by (adults + children)
.5. We 
pool one-adult and two-adult households, rank them together by equivalence-scale adjusted total 
expenditures on gasoline and other goods, and divide them into quintiles.
7   12 
  We estimate the demand system separately for one-adult and two-adult systems, by 
quintile.  For example, the number of observations in system estimation for quintile 1 one-adult 
households plus the number observations of quintile 1 two-adult households (estimated 
separately) equals 20% of the total sample of households.  We impose the restrictions in (6) 
through (9), drop the equation for other goods, and estimate the demand systems using three-
stage least squares.  We include in each system member and household characteristics that may 
affect gasoline or leisure shares:  the members’ age, age squared, race, sex (in the case of one-
adult households only), education, number of children, and number of vehicles.  We also include 
state-level characteristics:  population density, average drive time, and unemployment rate.  
Since these state-level data vary across the twelve quarters in our sample, we also include state 
dummy variables to account for other state-level sources of variation not captured by the 
included state-level characteristics.  Appendix 1 contains the full results for system estimation by 
quintile.   
Table 3 presents the compensated and uncompensated demand elasticities by quintile, 
evaluated using by quintile means.
8 These elasticity estimates aggregate together male and 
female leisure for two-adult households, and then aggregate together the one-adult and two-adult 
households in each quintile. 
Compensated own-price elasticities are negative for all but the first quintile, where the 
own-price elasticities for leisure and for other goods are insignificantly positive.  Compensated 
and uncompensated gasoline own-price elasticities range from about -0.5 (two-adult households) 
to -0.7, except for the top quintile, and fall in the span of estimates reported in gas demand 
survey articles.  The top quintile is substantially less responsive to increases in the price of 
gasoline, with own-price gas demand elasticities of  roughly -0.3.
9    13 
 
III.  Incidence Estimates 
  This section considers the incidence of a substantial increase in the gasoline tax, under a 
range of different assumptions about how the gas tax revenue is used and about how consumer 
demands react to the policy changes. 
 
A.  Modeling Incidence 
  We consider the effect of increasing the gasoline tax from its current level (which 
averages roughly 37 cents per gallon: the 18.4 cent federal gas tax plus the average state gas tax) 
to $1.39 per gallon.
10 This is the optimal second-best gas tax found by West and Williams [24], 
based on demand system estimates similar to those in the present paper, but with a representative 
agent model.  That study in turn used an estimate of 83 cents for the marginal external damage 
per gallon of gasoline, which was taken from a survey by Parry and Small [15].  For simplicity, 
we assume that the tax is changed only for gasoline used directly by households–there is no 
change in the tax on gasoline used as an intermediate input–and that supply in all industries is 
perfectly elastic.
11  Together, these assumptions imply that, for all goods, the change in price for 
a particular good will be equal to the change in the tax on that good.  We also assume that labor 
is perfectly substitutable across different skill and ability levels, which implies that the pre-tax 
wage for each individual will be unaffected by tax changes.  Finally, we ignore the external costs 
of gasoline consumption.  Incorporating such effects would raise the welfare estimates for all 
income groups (because the tax leads to reduced gasoline consumption), and might have 
important distributional effects if the external costs are unevenly distributed across income 
groups.   14 
  We consider three different assumptions about the revenue raised by the environmental 
tax: that it is discarded, that it is used to cut taxes on wage income, and that it is returned through 
a uniform lump-sum distribution.  The first assumption implies that the net wage and lump-sum 
income for each household will remain constant: only the price of gasoline changes.  The second 
assumption implies that net wages will rise, because the recycled revenue will lead to a drop in 
marginal tax rates.  We assume that this is an equal percentage-point cut in all brackets 
(equivalent to a cut in the Medicare payroll tax, for example).  The third assumption implies that 
household lump-sum income will rise.  We assume that this transfer is based on the number of 
adults in a household; thus, a two-adult household will receive twice the transfer that a one-adult 
household would get.  Under the latter two assumptions, the government budget constraint is 
given by 
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where xi
k is the consumption of good i by household k, τ i
k is the tax rate on good i for household 
k, and Ti
k is the lump-sum transfer to household k.  In each case, we calculate the demand for 
each good implied by a given income and vector of prices for each of the representative 
households, using the share equations (4a) and (4b).  We then solve numerically for the tax cut or 
increase in the lump-sum transfer (depending on how the revenue is recycled) that will exactly 
offset the increased gas tax revenue. 
  We calculate incidence under three different welfare measures, each of which makes a 
different assumption about demand elasticities.  The first assumes that all demand elasticities are 
zero.  The second considers non-zero demand elasticities, but ignores cross-price elasticities.  
The third incorporates all of the estimated demand elasticities.     15 
  In each case, we still use the full system of demand elasticities to calculate the change in 
the labor tax rate or lump-sum transfer that is made possible by the increased gas tax revenue; 
thus, the change in the tax or transfer is the same across all three incidence measures.  It is well-
known that cross-price elasticities (and particularly the cross-price elasticity with leisure) play an 
essential role in determining the overall efficiency of a tax.  Using the same tax and transfer 
changes for all three welfare measures minimizes the efficiency differences, allowing us to focus 
on how cross-price elasticities affect distribution. 
  Under the first assumption, we can calculate the incidence on each household as the sum 
over all goods of the price change for a given good times the household’s consumption of that 
good.   Thus, the incidence on household k is given by  
(11)  τ  i
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Where T 
k and τ  i
k  are the lump-sum transfer and vector of tax rates before the policy change, 
respectively.  This is simply the net change in tax payments that results from the change in taxes 
and transfers. 
  For the second assumption, we calculate the partial-equilibrium change in consumer 
surplus for each market in which a price changes: the gas market in all cases, plus the labor 
market in the case in which we assume that the additional gas tax revenue is used to cut the tax 
on labor.  Summing these consumer surplus changes and the change in income gives a measure 
of the change in welfare.  This measure effectively ignores the effects of cross-price elasticities 
on the incidence of the tax.  Thus, the incidence on household k is given by 
(12)  ∆ CS =
xi
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where  p  and p are the price vectors before and after the tax change, respectively, and ε i is the 
compensated own-price elasticity of demand for good i.
12 
  Under the third assumption, we calculate incidence using the equivalent variation, which, 
for our assumed utility function, is 
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where I  and I represent full income before and after the tax change, respectively, , and VI ,p ( )  is 
the indirect utility function,
13 defined by 
(14)  VI ,p () = ln I − α 0 − α k ln pk −
1
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Comparing these incidence estimates across different income groups will demonstrate how 
regressive or progressive a particular tax shift is.  Comparisons across the three different welfare 
measures will illustrate the importance (or lack thereof) of incorporating behavioral changes in 
incidence estimates. 
 
B.  Incidence Results  
  Table 4 presents the results of the incidence analysis.  For each of the three assumptions 
about the use of the additional revenue from the increased gas tax, it shows the welfare change 
for each income quintile as a percentage of total expenditure (on gasoline and other goods) for 
that quintile, under each of the three different welfare measures.  The table also provides the 
aggregate burden–the sum of the burden across all five quintiles, divided by the sum of 
expenditures–from the tax change, thus allowing a comparison of overall efficiency across the 
three uses for the additional revenue.     17 
  Finally, the table lists the Suits index for each case, which is a measure of the 
progressivity or regressivity of the tax change.  The Suits index is given by 
(15)  S = 1 − Ti + Ti− 1 ()
i= 1
5
∑ yi − yi− 1 ()  
where Ti = t j
j= 1
i
∑  and where yi and ti are quintile i’s shares of total expenditure and of the burden 
of the tax, respectively.
14  This measure is analogous to the Gini coefficient, and can range from 
–1 (if the entire burden of a new tax is borne by those with the lowest incomes) to 1 (if the entire 
burden is borne by those with the highest incomes).  The Suits index is usually calculated using 
the change in tax paid–equivalent to our equation (11)–as the measure of the tax burden, but can 
also be calculated using other measures, as we do here.  See Suits [20] for more detail on this 
index. 
  The table shows that increasing the gas tax will generally be regressive, but that the 
revenue can be returned in such a way as to change this result.  If the revenue is simply 
discarded, then the welfare cost as a fraction of expenditure is lower for higher-income groups.  
The cost to the first quintile, as a fraction of expenditure, is more than twice that for the top 
quintile.  The Suits index for this case is roughly –0.16.  As a comparison, the Suits index for the 
taxes considered by Suits [20] ranged from –0.17 to 0.36, so the regressivity of the gas tax is 
similar to that of the most regressive tax (the payroll tax) considered in that study.   This is not 
surprising; numerous studies have shown that gasoline has a larger budget share for lower-
income groups, and thus that the gas tax tends to be regressive. 
  If the revenue is used to cut the labor tax, all five quintiles are substantially better off than 
when the revenue is discarded.  Indeed, this is the most efficient of the three options considered 
for how to use the gas tax revenue; cutting the labor tax rate reduces the deadweight loss in the   18 
labor market.  However, the general pattern of regressivity remains.  The Suits index even falls 
slightly, suggesting that this use of the revenue makes the change very slightly more regressive.
15  
Lowering the labor tax provides a larger benefit for higher-income households, and thus it does 
nothing to offset the regressivity of the increased gas tax. 
  However, when the revenue is used to provide a lump-sum transfer to households, the 
pattern is different.  The bottom quintile is actually better off as a result of the change, even 
though our estimates ignore the external benefits of reduced gas consumption.  In this case, the 
increased transfer they receive more than offsets the higher price of gasoline.  For the other four 
quintiles, however, the effect of the higher gas price dominates, and so those households are 
made worse off.  In this case, the welfare cost as a fraction of expenditures is highest for the third 
and fourth quintiles; the lower quintiles do relatively well because of the progressive lump-sum 
transfer, and the gas share for the top quintile is small enough that even though that quintile’s 
relative benefit from the lump-sum transfer is small, it still does better than the middle-income 
groups.  The Suits index is roughly 0.14, indicating that this tax change is progressive overall; 
the increased lump-sum transfer is sufficiently progressive to overcome the regressivity of the 
gas tax.  
  This policy is less efficient than using the revenue to cut the labor tax rate; the overall 
welfare difference between the two policies is 0.1% of expenditures.  This cost is relatively small 
in absolute terms, but is substantial relative to the distributional effects.  Using the revenue for a 
lump-sum transfer rather than for a cut in the labor tax makes the average household in one of 
the bottom two quintiles better off by $143 per year, but at an average cost of $229 to the 
households in the top two quintiles.   19 
  Comparing the incidence measure that assumes no change in demand to either of the 
other measures shows that considering demand responses is important for measuring either the 
overall burden of the tax or the distribution of that burden.  Omitting demand responses will lead 
one to substantially overstate the welfare cost of the gas tax.  Given the magnitude of the tax 
change involved, this is hardly surprising; households will consume significantly less gasoline in 
response to such a large tax increase, and that reduces the burden of the tax increase. 
  Omitting demand responses also makes the gas tax appear more regressive.  Own-price 
gas demand elasticities are relatively similar across most of the income distribution, but gas 
demand for the top quintile is substantially less elastic.  Thus, the relative burden on the top 
quintile is larger under measures that include demand responses, making the tax more 
progressive.  This effect can be substantial; a gas tax increase with the revenue used to provide a 
lump-sum transfer appears to be slightly regressive (Suits index=-0.046) when demand responses 
are ignored, but including demand responses shows that this case is actually quite progressive 
(Suits index=0.14).  A similar, though less dramatic, pattern appears when the tax revenue is 
discarded or used to cut the labor tax.  
  Comparing the partial-equilibrium consumer surplus measure to the full equivalent 
variation shows that including cross-price effects in the welfare measure has little effect; these 
two measures yield very similar results.  Even for the large price changes considered here, cross-
price effects on demand are sufficiently weak that taking them into account makes little 
difference in the incidence analysis. 
  There is an important caveat to that result, however; even for the consumer surplus 
measure, the change in the labor tax or lump-sum transfer was still calculated using a demand 
system that includes cross-price effects.  If cross-price effects were ignored there, then the   20 
change in the labor tax or lump-sum transfer would be significantly different; for the gas tax 
change we consider, the changes in the labor tax rate or lump-sum transfer predicted by a partial-
equilibrium model would be just over half as large as those predicted by the general-equilibrium 
model, whereas the changes that would be predicted if behavioral changes were ignored would 
be nearly twice as large.  As is clear from the table, the tax rate and transfer amount play an 
important role, affecting both the overall welfare gain and the relative standing of the different 
quintiles.  In essence, cross-price effects are important for the overall efficiency of the policy, 
and so they can be important for distributional analysis even though they do not directly affect 
the incidence of a particular set of tax and transfer changes. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
  This paper has analyzed the distributional effects of increasing the gasoline tax, under a 
range of assumptions about how the revenue is recycled and for a range of different welfare 
measures.  It shows that increasing the gasoline tax will generally be regressive, though it can 
become somewhat progressive if the additional revenue is used to provide a lump-sum transfer to 
households; the progressivity of the transfer slightly outweighs the regressivity of the tax 
increase.   
Our use of Consumer Expenditure Survey data and estimation of the almost-ideal demand 
system allows us to incorporate behavioral responses, including cross-price effects, in our 
incidence calculations.  Similar data and techniques could be used to examine the incidence of 
other environmental taxes across income groups, regions, or urban versus rural households.  
Incorporating demand responses into our incidence calculations results in significantly 
lower estimates of the tax burden on all groups, because gas consumption falls substantially in   21 
response to the increased tax.  It has little effect, however, on the relative burden on different 
income groups, though.  While the top quintile has a substantially lower gas demand elasticity, 
so incorporating demand responses makes the tax change appear slightly more progressive, the 
effect is small because gas demand elasticities are similar for the other four quintiles. 
For a given set of tax rate and transfer changes, calculating incidence using a welfare 
measure that incorporates cross-price elasticities makes almost no difference.  However, such 
cross-price elasticities may still affect incidence, because they play an important role in 
determining the changes in other tax rates or transfers made possible by the gas tax revenue.  Or, 
in other words, because cross-price elasticities affect the efficiency of a particular tax change, 
they can be important for distributional analysis even though their direct effect on incidence is 
insignificant.  
  Furthermore, even our partial-equilibrium calculations used elasticity estimates from a 
demand system that does not impose separability.  It might be valuable for future research to 
compare these results to a demand system that imposes separability in the estimation, such as the 
linear expenditure system.   22 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Workers in One-Adult Households 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Gasoline per Week (gallons)  12.07  11.82 
Hours per Week  40.36  11.90 
Gasoline Share of Expenditures  .02  .02 
Leisure Share of Expenditures  .52  .16 
Other Good Share of Expenditures  .47  .16 
Gas Price ($)  1.19  .11 
Other Good Price (index)  103.99  10.51 
Net Wage ($)  9.73  3.05 
ln(y/P) 3.39  0.33 
Education    
Less than High School Diploma (%)  8.0  - 
High School Diploma (%)  26.0  - 
More than High School Diploma (%)  66.0  - 
Race    
White (%)  80.0  - 
Black (%)  16.0  - 
Asian (%)  1.0  - 
Other race (%)  3.0  - 
Female (%)  56.00  - 
Number of Kids  .42  .90 
Region    
Northeast (%)  15.0  - 
Midwest (%)  24.0  - 
South (%)  32.0  - 
West (%)  28.0  - 
Number of Vehicles  1.09  1.02 
State Average Drive Time to Work (minutes)  22.10  2.91 
State Population Density (persons/mile
2) 235.05  555.69 
State Unemployment Rate (%)  4.95  1.14 
Observations 3633  -   23 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Workers in Two-Adult Households 
Variable Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Gasoline per Week (gallons)  26.92  18.61 
Male Hours per Week  41.37  11.45 
Female Hours per Week  40.03  23.82 
Gasoline Share of Expenditures  .02  .01 
Male Leisure Share of Expenditures  .27  .17 
Female Leisure Share of Expenditures  .27  .17 
Other Good Share of Expenditures  .44  .13 
Gas Price ($)  1.19  .11 
Other Good Price (index)  103.60  10.55 
Male Net Wage ($)  11.08  3.16 
Female Net Wage ($)  8.60  2.27 
ln(y/P) 3.62  .94 
Male Education     
Less than High School Diploma (%)  8.0  - 
High School Diploma (%)  27.0  - 
More than High School Diploma (%)  65.0  - 
Female Education     
Less than High School Diploma (%)  7.0  - 
High School Diploma (%)  28.0  - 
More than High School Diploma (%)  65.0  - 
Race of Household Head      
White (%)  89.0  - 
Black (%)  7.0  - 
Asian (%)  1.0  - 
Other race (%)  3.0  - 
Number of Kids  .48  .82 
Region    
Northeast (%)  16.0  - 
Midwest (%)  25.0  - 
South (%)  34.0  - 
West (%)  25.0  - 
Number of Vehicles  2.46  1.59 
State Average Drive Time to Work (minutes)  22.09  2.83 
State Population Density (persons/mile
2) 217.94  388.09 
State Unemployment Rate (%)  4.89  1.09 
Observations 6270  - 
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Table 3:  Estimated Elasticities by Quintile 
Quintile 1 
Compensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.651  0.061  0.590 
Leisure   0.002  0.025  -0.071 
Other Good  0.037  -0.062  0.025 
      
Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.666  0.463  0.358 
Leisure   -0.020  0.626  -0.115 
Other Good  0.028  0.184  -0.104 
 
Quintile 2 
Compensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.768  -0.088  0.856 
Leisure   -0.002  0.000  -0.005 
Other Good  0.048  0.012  -0.060 
      
Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.785  0.357  0.537 
Leisure   -0.026  0.616  0.008 
Other Good  0.035  0.354  -0.293 
 
Quintile 3 
Compensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.674  -0.063  0.737 
Leisure   -0.002  -0.020  -0.027 
Other Good  0.037  0.041  -0.079 
      
Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.693  0.385  0.368 
Leisure   -0.027  0.573  -0.002 
Other Good  0.023  0.390  -0.360 
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Quintile 4 
Compensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.757  -0.016  0.773 
Leisure   -0.001  -0.175  -0.172 
Other Good  0.033  0.215  -0.248 
      
Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.775  0.407  0.355 
Leisure   -0.025  0.402  -0.130 
Other Good  0.018  0.565  -0.587 
 
Quintile 5 
Compensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.322  0.209  0.114 
Leisure   0.008  -0.334  -0.085 
Other Good  0.003  0.211  -0.214 
      
Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
  Gas Price  Wage  Other Good Price 
Gasoline -0.337  0.558  -0.463 
Leisure   -0.009  0.080  -0.103 
Other Good  -0.011  0.545  -0.767 
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Table 4: Incidence of an Increased Gas Tax 
 
 










Equivalent  Variation  -3.95% -3.41% -3.13% -2.59% -1.74%  -2.51%  -0.163 
Partial  Equilibrium 
Consumer  Surplus  -4.02% -3.51% -3.19% -2.63% -1.83%  -2.58%  -0.157 
No Demand 
Response  -4.99% -4.46% -3.99% -3.36% -2.01%  -3.13%  -0.185 
 
 
Additional gas tax revenue used to cut labor tax rate: 
      
 Quintile 






Equivalent  Variation  -1.17% -0.87% -0.88% -0.55% -0.47%  -0.65%  -0.175 
Partial  Equilibrium 
Consumer  Surplus  -1.22% -0.96% -0.92% -0.57% -0.53%  -0.70%  -0.159 
No Demand 
Response  -2.19% -1.91% -1.72% -1.32% -0.72%  -1.26%  -0.226 
 
 
Additional gas tax revenue used to provide lump-sum transfer to households: 
 Quintile 






Equivalent  Variation  0.45% -0.53% -0.93% -0.92% -0.85%  -0.75%  0.139 
Partial  Equilibrium 
Consumer  Surplus  0.42% -0.60% -0.96% -0.94% -0.92%  -0.80%  0.140 
No Demand 
Response  -0.54% -1.55% -1.76% -1.67% -1.10%  -1.35%  -0.046 
 
Gas tax is increased to $1.39/gallon in all cases. 
Each welfare measure is expressed as a percentage of total expenditures (on gasoline and other goods).   27 
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Table A-1:  One-adult Household Regression Results by Quintile 
  
  Quintile 1  Quintile 2 
  gasshare leisshare gasshare leisshare 
ln(gasprice) 0.0092  -0.0083  -0.0116  -0.0084 
  (0.0061) (0.0039) (0.0069) (0.0041) 
ln(wage) -0.0083  0.0518  -0.0084  0.0973 
  (0.0039) (0.0158) (0.0041) (0.0078) 
ln(other good price)  -0.0009  -0.0436  0.0200  -0.0889 
  (0.0070) (0.0151) (0.0071) (0.0065) 
ln(y/P) -0.0036  0.2779  0.0030  0.2373 
  (0.0013) (0.0053) (0.0020) (0.0038) 
Age  0.0002 -0.0024  0.0000 -0.0001 
  (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Age Squared  -0.000004  0.000028  -0.000001  0.000004 
  (0.000004) (0.000017) (0.000005) (0.000010) 
High School Degree  -0.0068  0.0111  -0.0043  0.0067 
  (0.0016) (0.0064) (0.0024) (0.0044) 
More than HS Degree  -0.0089  0.0170  -0.0068  0.0056 
  (0.0020) (0.0081) (0.0027) (0.0050) 
Black  0.0025 -0.0298  0.0021 -0.0082 
  (0.0014) (0.0055) (0.0018) (0.0033) 
Asian  0.0104 0.0039 0.0007 -0.0274 
  (0.0047) (0.0188) (0.0073) (0.0136) 
Other Race  0.0090  -0.0433  -0.0019  0.0095 
  (0.0032) (0.0126) (0.0038) (0.0070) 
Female -0.0045  -0.0067  -0.0036  -0.0023 
  (0.0012) (0.0048) (0.0014) (0.0026) 
Number of Kids  -0.0006  -0.0259  -0.0002  -0.0529 
  (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
Number of Vehicles  0.0019  0.0089  0.0037  -0.0064 
  (0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
State Average Drive Time   0.0009  -0.0005  0.0014  -0.0039 
  (0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0014) 
State Population Density   -0.0000  0.0001  -0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
State Unemp. Rate  0.0007  0.0002  0.0001  0.0027 
  (0.0009) (0.0035) (0.0011) (0.0021) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (gas)   -0.0203  0.0936  -0.0096  0.0132 
  (0.0024) (0.0097) (0.0030) (0.0056) 
Constant 0.0426  -0.2016  -0.0795  0.0033 
  (0.0331) (0.0807) (0.0350) (0.0405) 
Observations 1178  1178  803  803 
Three-stage least squares regressions, occupation instruments for ln(wage).   
All regressions also include state dummy variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A-1:  One-adult Household Regression Results by Quintile (continued) 
 
  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
 gasshare  leisshare  gasshare  leisshare  gasshare  leisshare 
ln(gasprice) 0.0002  -0.0144  0.0078  -0.0110  -0.0058  0.0007 
 (0.0073)  (0.0038)  (0.0075)  (0.0035)  (0.0094)  (0.0046) 
ln(wage) -0.0144  0.1067  -0.0110  0.0919  0.0007  0.0860 
 (0.0038)  (0.0073)  (0.0035)  (0.0086)  (0.0046)  (0.0284) 
ln(other good price)  0.0142  -0.0923  0.0032  -0.0809  0.0051  -0.0866 
 (0.0074)  (0.0057)  (0.0079)  (0.0077)  (0.0103)  (0.0291) 
ln(y/P) 0.0019  0.2425  0.0027  0.2527  -0.0023  0.1320 
 (0.0023)  (0.0042)  (0.0022)  (0.0053)  (0.0026)  (0.0165) 
Age 0.0000  0.0010  0.0000  0.0004  0.0009  -0.0004 
 (0.0005)  (0.0009)  (0.0005)  (0.0012)  (0.0006)  (0.0035) 
Age Squared  0.000001  -0.000014  -0.000000  -0.000005  -0.000012  0.000025 
 (0.000006)  (0.000010)  (0.000006)  (0.000014)  (0.000006)  (0.000040) 
High School Degree  -0.0049  0.0066  -0.0006  0.0092  0.0023  -0.0101 
 (0.0035)  (0.0066)  (0.0032)  (0.0075)  (0.0045)  (0.0280) 
More than HS Degree  -0.0039  0.0061  -0.0026  0.0151  0.0008  0.0043 
 (0.0036)  (0.0066)  (0.0032)  (0.0076)  (0.0046)  (0.0288) 
Black 0.0002  -0.0021  0.0021  -0.0026  -0.0006  0.0136 
 (0.0019)  (0.0035)  (0.0020)  (0.0049)  (0.0023)  (0.0143) 
Asian -0.0067  0.0211  -0.0040  0.0151  -0.0098  0.0325 
 (0.0063)  (0.0118)  (0.0069)  (0.0166)  (0.0101)  (0.0631) 
Other Race  0.0017  -0.0021  0.0022  -0.0069  -0.0031  0.0109 
 (0.0036)  (0.0066)  (0.0030)  (0.0073)  (0.0037)  (0.0229) 
Female -0.0033  0.0019  -0.0043  0.0053  -0.0029  0.0019 
 (0.0014)  (0.0026)  (0.0013)  (0.0032)  (0.0015)  (0.0095) 
Number of Kids  0.0006  -0.0638  -0.0022  -0.0643  -0.0026  -0.0489 
 (0.0010)  (0.0018)  (0.0011)  (0.0026)  (0.0015)  (0.0092) 
Number of Vehicles  0.0029  -0.0032  0.0011  -0.0021  0.0022  -0.0141 
 (0.0009)  (0.0016)  (0.0007)  (0.0017)  (0.0006)  (0.0040) 
State Average Drive Time   0.0009  -0.0076  0.0012  -0.0098  0.0012  0.0017 
 (0.0010)  (0.0018)  (0.0009)  (0.0021)  (0.0012)  (0.0076) 
State Population Density   -0.0000  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0002 
 (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0004) 
State Unemp. Rate  -0.0007  0.0042  0.0018  0.0023  0.0013  -0.0025 
 (0.0012)  (0.0022)  (0.0010)  (0.0025)  (0.0013)  (0.0078) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (gas)   -0.0089  0.0101  -0.0097  0.0261  -0.0016  0.0300 
 (0.0033)  (0.0062)  (0.0032)  (0.0076)  (0.0037)  (0.0232) 
Constant -0.0327  -0.0373  -0.0045  -0.1181  -0.0466  0.0021 
 (0.0383)  (0.0451)  (0.0410)  (0.0577)  (0.0516)  (0.2021) 
Observations 635  635  539  539  478  478 
Three-stage least squares regressions, occupation instruments for ln(wage).   
All regressions also include state dummy variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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  Table A-2:  Two-adult Household Regression Results by Quintile  
 
  Quintile 1  Quintile 2 








ln(gasprice)  0.0033 -0.0053  -0.0053 0.0101 -0.0080  -0.0080 
  (0.0053) (0.0018)  (0.0018) (0.0049) (0.0013)  (0.0014) 
ln(male  wage)  -0.0053  0.0969  -0.0313 -0.0080 0.0871 -0.0074 
  (0.0018) (0.0077)  (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0045)  (0.0019) 
ln(female wage)  -0.0053  -0.0313  0.1078  -0.0080  -0.0074  0.1155 
  (0.0018) (0.0037)  (0.0070) (0.0014) (0.0019)  (0.0041) 
ln(other good price)  0.0073  -0.0604  -0.0713  0.0059  -0.0717  -0.1001 
  (0.0059) (0.0105)  (0.0101) (0.0053) (0.0057)  (0.0055) 
ln(y/P)  -0.0033 0.0277  0.0262 -0.0046  0.0359 0.0407 
  (0.0011) (0.0048)  (0.0044) (0.0009) (0.0032)  (0.0029) 
Age  0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0013 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0023 
  (0.0003) (0.0006)  (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Age  Squared  -0.000003 0.000006  0.000012 -0.000002  0.000002 0.000019 
  (0.000003) (0.000004)  (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003)  (0.000002) 
High School Degree  -0.0002  0.0015  -0.0077  -0.0004  0.0125  -0.0045 
  (0.0010) (0.0053)  (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0044)  (0.0038) 
More than HS Degree  -0.0011  0.0023  0.0047  -0.0001  0.0162  -0.0022 
  (0.0013) (0.0065)  (0.0052) (0.0015) (0.0051)  (0.0045) 
Black  0.0010 -0.0021  -0.0062 0.0003 -0.0062  0.0128 
  (0.0014) (0.0060)  (0.0042) (0.0013) (0.0042)  (0.0033) 
Asian 0.0023  0.0070  -0.0153  -0.0016  0.0236  0.0002 
  (0.0037) (0.0179)  (0.0103) (0.0040) (0.0128)  (0.0091) 
Other Race  0.0054  -0.0147  0.0102  0.0006  0.0330  -0.0015 
  (0.0047) (0.0126)  (0.0148) (0.0042) (0.0091)  (0.0084) 
Number of Kids  0.0002  -0.0146  -0.0108  0.0007  -0.0233  -0.0115 
  (0.0004) (0.0022)  (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0018)  (0.0015) 
Number of Vehicles  0.0027  -0.0053  -0.0069  0.0017  -0.0072  0.0007 
  (0.0006) (0.0024)  (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0016)  (0.0013) 
State Avg. Drive Time  0.0016  -0.0016  0.0008  0.0015  -0.0055  -0.0038 
  (0.0005) (0.0030)  (0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0021)  (0.0018) 
State Population Density  -0.0000  -0.0003  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
  (0.0000) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
State Unemp. Rate  -0.0004  -0.0006  -0.0034  -0.0012  0.0099  -0.0061 
  (0.0009) (0.0045)  (0.0041) (0.0007) (0.0032)  (0.0028) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (gas)  -0.0246  -0.0824  0.0297  -0.0041  -0.1438  0.0075 
  (0.0140) (0.0443)  (0.0460) (0.0133) (0.0344)  (0.0289) 
Constant -0.0152  0.4894  0.4415  0.0144  0.4166  0.5196 
  (0.0250) (0.0616)  (0.0567) (0.0227) (0.0417)  (0.0358) 
Observations 802  802  802  1178  1178  1178 
Three-stage least squares regressions, occupation instruments for ln(wage).   
All regressions also include state dummy variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Table A-2:  Two-adult Household Regression Results by Quintile (Continued) 
 
  Quintile 3  Quintile 4 








ln(gasprice)  0.0078 -0.0060  -0.0063 0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0051 
  (0.0046) (0.0011)  (0.0012) (0.0036) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
ln(male  wage)  -0.0060 0.0913  -0.0036 -0.0048 0.0858 0.0012 
  (0.0011) (0.0038)  (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0039) (0.0018) 
ln(female  wage)  -0.0063 -0.0036  0.0975 -0.0051 0.0012 0.0848 
  (0.0012) (0.0018)  (0.0039) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0040) 
ln(other good price)  0.0045  -0.0816  -0.0876  0.0064  -0.0822  -0.0809 
  (0.0051) (0.0050)  (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0052) 
ln(y/P)  -0.0027 0.0481  0.0335 -0.0028 0.0507 0.0362 
  (0.0008) (0.0031)  (0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0031) 
Age  0.0007 -0.0008  -0.0009 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0004 
  (0.0002) (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age  Squared  -0.000008 0.000012  0.000011 -0.000008 0.000012 0.000008 
  (0.000003) (0.000002)  (0.000002) (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000002) 
High  School  Degree  -0.0012 0.0017  -0.0061 -0.0031 0.0054 -0.0156 
  (0.0014) (0.0044)  (0.0047) (0.0015) (0.0065) (0.0057) 
More  than  HS  Degree -0.0011 0.0067  0.0016 -0.0017 0.0108 -0.0073 
  (0.0015) (0.0049)  (0.0053) (0.0015) (0.0068) (0.0063) 
Black -0.0002  -0.0150  0.0035  0.0016  0.0032  -0.0062 
  (0.0014) (0.0047)  (0.0039) (0.0013) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Asian  0.0000 -0.0043  -0.0075 0.0105 0.0047 -0.0245 
  (0.0041) (0.0100)  (0.0133) (0.0036) (0.0115) (0.0180) 
Other  Race  0.0044 0.0049  0.0123 0.0005 0.0248 0.0044 
  (0.0037) (0.0096)  (0.0076) (0.0031) (0.0092) (0.0086) 
Number of Kids  0.0003  -0.0256  -0.0125  -0.0007  -0.0230  -0.0134 
  (0.0004) (0.0017)  (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
Number of Vehicles  0.0013  -0.0025  -0.0014  0.0013  -0.0019  -0.0019 
  (0.0003) (0.0011)  (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
State Avg. Drive Time  0.0010  0.0010  -0.0054  0.0005  -0.0041  -0.0026 
  (0.0004) (0.0018)  (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
State Population Density  -0.0000  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0000  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
State Unemp. Rate  -0.0004  -0.0007  0.0014  0.0004  0.0011  0.0028 
  (0.0006) (0.0027)  (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (gas)  -0.0127  -0.0637  -0.0743  -0.0048  -0.1158  0.0062 
  (0.0110) (0.0311)  (0.0288) (0.0100) (0.0316) (0.0313) 
Constant  0.0031 0.3051  0.4808 -0.0000 0.3616 0.3263 
  (0.0220) (0.0349)  (0.0314) (0.0178) (0.0378) (0.0359) 
Observations  1346 1346  1346 1442 1442 1442 
Three-stage least squares regressions, occupation instruments for ln(wage).   
All regressions also include state dummy variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A-2:  Two-adult Household Regression Results by Quintile (Continued) 
 
 Quintile  5 




ln(gasprice) 0.0130  -0.0013  -0.0012 
 (0.0035)  (0.0008)  (0.0009) 
ln(male wage)  -0.0013  0.0494  -0.0043 
 (0.0008)  (0.0056)  (0.0027) 
ln(female wage)  -0.0012  -0.0043  0.0515 
 (0.0009)  (0.0027)  (0.0059) 
ln(other good price)  -0.0106  -0.0438  -0.0460 
 (0.0038)  (0.0075)  (0.0077) 
ln(y/P) -0.0003  0.0133  0.0194 
 (0.0008)  (0.0054)  (0.0047) 
Age 0.0003  0.0009  -0.0001 
 (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Age Squared  -0.000003  -0.000004  0.000003 
 (0.000002)  (0.000003)  (0.000002) 
High School Degree  0.0012  0.0070  0.0031 
 (0.0018)  (0.0096)  (0.0111) 
More than HS Degree  0.0007  0.0208  0.0182 
 (0.0019)  (0.0102)  (0.0122) 
Black -0.0009  -0.0093  -0.0140 
 (0.0013)  (0.0078)  (0.0066) 
Asian 0.0089  0.0172  -0.0162 
 (0.0030)  (0.0185)  (0.0158) 
Other Race  -0.0061  -0.0414  -0.0502 
 (0.0023)  (0.0093)  (0.0088) 
Number of Kids  -0.0007  -0.0149  -0.0071 
 (0.0004)  (0.0027)  (0.0024) 
Number of Vehicles  0.0010  0.0029  0.0049 
 (0.0002)  (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
State Avg. Drive Time  0.0007  0.0027  -0.0045 
 (0.0004)  (0.0026)  (0.0023) 
State Population Density  -0.0000  -0.0000  0.0003 
 (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
State Unemp. Rate  -0.0003  0.0017  0.0076 
 (0.0005)  (0.0030)  (0.0027) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (gas)  0.0220  0.2677  0.2986 
 (0.0081)  (0.0345)  (0.0331) 
Constant 0.0392  0.0744  0.1528 
 (0.0177)  (0.0519)  (0.0493) 
Observations 1502  1502  1502 
Three-stage least squares regressions, occupation instruments for ln(wage).   
All regressions also include state dummy variables. Standard errors in parentheses.   34 
Appendix 2  
 
Demand Elasticities in Terms of Estimated Parameters 
 
The demand system used in this paper does not yield elasticity estimates directly; instead, 
the demand elasticities are functions of the estimated parameters.  The uncompensated demand 
elasticity for good i with respect to the price of good j (where j is any good except leisure) is given 
by 
















where si is expenditure on good i as a share of full income, and where dij is the Kronecker delta, 
equal to 1 if i=j and zero otherwise. 
The uncompensated demand elasticity for good i with respect to a change in the wage 
(either the male wage or the female wage in the case of a two-earner household) is given by 
 












  − dij +
β i
si
sLj − sj () + sLj  
where sLj is the share of the particular individual's time endowment in total income for the couple: 
that individual's wage times his/her time endowment divided by y.  Thus, for example, if both 
individuals in a couple have the same wage (and the same time endowment), and non-labor 
income is zero, then sLf = 0.5 and sLm = 0.5.  Similarly, for a single-earner household with zero 
non-labor income, sL is 1. 
  The compensated elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the price of good j is 
given by 













  − dij + sj   35 
Finally, the income elasticity of demand for good i is given by 





Equation (A1) is derived by taking the derivative of the demand function implied by the Deaton-
Muellbauer system (see equation 8 in Deaton and Muellbauer, [6]) with respect to price, 
converting the derivative into an elasticity, and simplifying.  A similar process with respect to 
income yields (A4).  Deriving the uncompensated elasticity with respect to the wage (A2) is 
similar to the derivation of (A1), but one must account for the change in full income that results 
from a change in the wage.  The process for deriving the compensated elasticity (A3) is also 
similar, but uses the Slutsky equation, because the demand function given in Deaton and 
Muellbauer [6] is uncompensated. 
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1 Correspondence can be addressed to either author at the addresses above, or by E-mail to 
wests@macalester.edu or to rwilliam@eco.utexas.edu.  For their helpful comments and 
suggestions, we thank Don Fullerton, Larry Goulder, Michael Greenstone, Dan Hamermesh, Gib 
Metcalf, Ian Parry, Raymond Robertson, Ken Small, Steve Trejo, Pete Wilcoxen, and participants 
in the November 2001 and May 2002 NBER Environmental Economics Conferences.  For their 
excellent research assistance, we thank Trey Miller and Jim Sallee.  
 
2 See also Dahl [4], Dahl and Sterner [5], and Espey [7] for reviews of the gasoline demand 
literature.   
 
3 Metcalf [12] also considers different scenarios for the use of environmental tax revenue, holding 
household behavior constant, and finds that a reform can be designed so that replacement of other 
taxes by environmental taxes can have a “negligible effect on the income distribution” (p. 655).   
 
4 West [23] allows for behavioral responses when calculating distributional effects, but does not 
include cross-price effects.  Cornwell and Creedy [3] use a linear expenditure system (LES) to 
determine the distributional effects of a carbon tax in Australia.  The LES allows them to consider 
many markets simultaneously, but imposes separability among goods.  They also hold labor 
supply constant.  Symons et al. [21] use the more flexible almost ideal demand system to 
determine the effects of a carbon tax in Sweden.  Their system does not include labor supply. 
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5  Regressions without instruments for the wage generate results that are very similar to those 
presented here.  We also experiment with regressions that use state gas tax rates as instruments for 
gas prices.  Results from those regressions are also very similar to those presented here.     
 
6  Alderman and Sahn [1] and Heien and Wessels [10] also use this procedure.  These discrete-
choice estimates are available from the authors by request, as are the estimates used to correct 
wages for selectivity bias.  Shonkwiler and Yen [18] find that especially in the case of a large 
number of censored observations, the Heien and Wessels [10] procedure is biased.  Two factors 
suggest that this bias is unlikely to significantly influence our results.  First, we have only a small 
number of censored observations: in the one-adult sample, 481 households buy no gasoline; in the 
two-adult sample 135 households buy none.  Second, use of estimates from regressions that make 
no correction for sample selection do not significantly affect incidence results.  
 
7  This equivalence scale is suggested by Williams et al. [25], which also considers several 
alternatives and finds that the choice of equivalence scale has little effect on distributional 
estimates.  We find a similar result: changing the relative weight given to adults and children in 
the equivalence scale has little effect on the ranking of households. 
 
8 Appendix 2 provides equations for these elasticities in terms of the estimated parameters. 
 
9 These are short-run elasticities; households in our system do not respond to gas price increases 
by, for example, buying more fuel-efficient cars.  To the extent that wealthier households may be 
more able than poor households to avoid gas taxes in the long run by switching vehicles, our use   38 
                                                                                                                                                                
of short-run elasticities will result in incidence estimates that are biased towards greater 
progressivity.  
 
10 Because the initial level of the gas tax differs across states, the average gas tax rate paid differs 
slightly across quintiles.  Thus, because the gas tax is increased to the same level for all quintiles, 
the amount of the tax increase also varies slightly across quintiles.  The results would be very 
similar, however, if we were to hold the tax increase, rather than the new tax rate, constant across 
quintiles; the difference between the highest tax rate faced by any quintile and the lowest is less 
than three cents. 
 
11 The effects of an increase in gas prices on other goods is likely to be small: Metcalf [12] uses 
Benchmark Input-Output Accounts to determine the effect of a 15% gas price increase on other 
goods’ prices.   He finds that other goods’ prices increase by no more than 0.6%; most goods’ 
prices increase by 0.2% or less.  Our scenario increases gas prices by about 85%, implying that 
other goods’ prices would rise by no more than 3.4%.  
 
12 Consumer surplus for each good is the integral over the quantity purchased of the difference 
between the inverse demand and the price.  We assume a constant-elasticity demand curve, 
calculate the change in this integral resulting from the change in price, sum over all goods, and 
simplify yield equation (12). 
 
13 The equivalent variation is the change in income that–holding prices constant–would yield the 
same change in utility as do the new prices and transfers.  Equation (13) is derived by calculating 
the change in expenditure to yield the same utility change, using the Deaton-Muellbauer 
expenditure function (equation 4 from Deaton and Muellbauer [6]) and the indirect utility   39 
                                                                                                                                                                
function, then subtracting the change in the transfer.  Simplifying the resulting expression yields 
equation (13).  The indirect utility function (equation 14) is derived by inverting equation (4) from 
Deaton and Muellbauer [6] and simplifying. 
 
14 Equation (15) is equivalent to equation (4) from Suits [20], except that it bases the calculation 
on five quintiles, rather than on ten deciles. 
 
15 This may seem inconsistent with Suits [20] finding that the payroll tax is regressive.  The 
difference results because we consider a cut in the tax rate for all brackets, which is roughly a 
proportional tax change, whereas the Social Security payroll tax has a cap, making it regressive. 